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Abstract—Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) is a software
exploit for system compromise. By chaining short instruction
sequences from existing code pieces, ROP can bypass static
code-integrity checking approaches and non-executable page
protections. Existing defenses either require access to source code
or binary, a customized compiler or hardware modifications, or
suffer from high performance and storage overhead. In this
work, we propose SIGDROP, a low-cost approach for ROP
detection which uses low-level properties inherent to ROP attacks.
Specifically, we observe special patterns of certain hardware
events when a ROP attack occurs during program execution.
Such hardware event-based patterns form signatures to flag ROP
attacks at runtime. SIGDROP leverages Hardware Performance
Counters, which are already present in commodity processors,
to efficiently capture and extract the signatures. Our evaluation
demonstrates that SIGDROP can effectively detect ROP attacks
with acceptable performance overhead and negligible storage
overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
Return-Oriented-Programming (ROP) is a code-reuse attack
approach that allows an adversary to subvert software control
flow and to execute arbitrary (malicious) code [1]. In a ROP
attack, the adversary constructs the malicious code by chaining
sequences of instructions that end with return instructions
(gadgets). ROP attacks can compromise user-level [1] and
kernel-level software modules [2].
A. Motivation
Customized compiler, address space layout randomization
(ASLR) and control flow integrity (CFI) checking are the
common solutions used to thwart ROP attacks. Customized
compiler-based approaches thwart ROP attacks by eliminating
gadgets binaries without altering legitimate software behavior
[3]. Such approaches require access to the software source
code which may not be available. ASLR randomly arranges
the addresses of the stack, heap, and libraries of a process,
preventing the adversary from predicting the addresses of
the gadgets and the program stack [4]. However, ASLR is
vulnerable to information leakage attacks that expose the
memory layout [5]. Further it does not protect against just-in-
time (JIT) ROP attacks [6]. In a CFI approach, the software
execution flow is compared to a pre-determined golden model
that is computed via the software static control flow graph
(CFG) or a golden execution model [7][8][9][10]. However,
CFI approaches face two main limitations:
Low Low Portable No SourcePerf. Storage Code
KBouncer [7] 3 7 7 3
ROPecker [8] 3 7 7 3
ROPDefender [9] 7 7 3 3
G-Free [3] 3 3 3 7
Hardware-CFI [10] 3 3 7 3
SCRAP [11] 3 3 7 3
SIGDROP 3 3 3 3
TABLE I: Comparison of SIGDROP to other ROP detection approaches.
1) performance and storage overheads: CFI solutions such
as ROPDefender [1] use binary instrumentation to moni-
tor software execution and incur performance overheads
of up to 3x. Other CFI solutions require up to 19 MB
of additional memory to store the golden software model
[8]. These overheads are not practical to secure embedded
systems with real-time execution requirements or with
limited hardware resources.
2) hardware modifications: hardware-based CFI solutions
such as the one proposed in [10] add new instructions
to the processor architecture and are thus not suitable for
commodity platforms already in the market.
B. Contribution
Based on the requirements of a ROP attack, we observe that
a ROP payload has the following low-level properties: a) a
sufficiently long chain of gadgets with few instructions in
each gadget [8]; b) a mispredicted return for each gadget
because the target address is not on top of the return
address stack. These properties are inherent to any ROP
payload and are independent of the monitored program. One
can thus use these properties to detect ROP payloads without
incurring the limitations of ASLR and CFI approaches.
We propose SIGDROP: a signature-based ROP detection
approach that leverages the low-level properties of a ROP
payload to detect ROP attacks. SIGDROP uses hardware
performance counters (HPCs) readily available in commodity
processors to form a runtime signature of the software at
different intervals, and notifies a trusted software module when
the signature reflects the properties of a ROP payload. We
implement a prototype of SIGDROP on the Linux platform.
Our implementation and evaluation show that SIGDROP can
detect ROP attacks without requiring source code access, cus-
tomized compiler support and binary rewriting. It is portable to
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commodity desktops, laptops, and embedded systems without
hardware modifications, and has low performance and neg-
ligible storage costs. Table I compares several recent ROP
detection mechanisms to SIGDROP.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II,
we review ROP attacks and hardware performance counters.
We detail the inner workings of SIGDROP in Section III
and present its implementation in Section IV. In Section V,
we evaluate the security effectiveness, performance cost and
storage overhead of SIGDROP. We compare our approach to
other ROP countermeasures in Section VI, and we conclude
the paper in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Return Address Stack
The return address stack (RAS) is a last-in-first-out hard-
ware stack that stores predicted target addresses of return
instructions. The processor manages the RAS based on the
assumption that each call instruction has an associated
return instruction (and vice versa). When a call instruction
is fetched, the processor pushes the address of the next
instruction on the RAS. When a return instruction is fetched,
the processor pops the RAS to predict the target address of
the return. The RAS mispredicts the target address due to
an overflow or during mis-speculated execution (i.e. miss-
peculated branch path has return instructions).
B. Return Oriented Programming
The basic idea of ROP is to reuse instructions already
residing in memory (e.g. shared libraries, software binary)
to induce arbitrary code execution. This allows the adversary
to bypass security countermeasures such as data execution
prevention that thwart code injection attacks [1].
A ROP attack works in two stages: gadget discovery
and gadget chaining. During gadget discovery, the adversary
searches the memory space for gadgets: sequences of instruc-
tions that end with return instructions. Each gadget performs
an atomic operation of the malicious payload (e.g. move value
to register or memory, add value to register, make system
call). Figure 1 illustrates the gadget chaining. In this stage,
the adversary first finds a software vulnerability such as a
stack-based buffer overflow to control and corrupt the software
program stack1. The adversary then writes the addresses of the
gadgets on top of the program stack in the order that reflects
the execution of the malicious payload.
C. Hardware Performance Counters
HPCs are a set of special-purpose registers built into the
performance monitoring unit of modern microprocessors to
store the number of occurrences of hardware activities. HPCs
were originally designed for performance debugging of com-
plex software systems. HPCs work along with hardware event
selectors which specify the counted hardware events, and the
digital logic which increments a counter when a hardware
1The software program stack is different from the hardware-controlled RAS.
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Fig. 1: ROP Gadget Chaining. The adversary uses a software vulnerability such as
stack-based buffer overflow to control and corrupt the program stack. The adversary
then writes the address of each ROP gadget on top of the program stack and moves the
stack pointer to the address of the first gadget. Each gadget executed returns to the top of
the stack where the address of the next gadget is located. The stack pointer thus servers
as the instruction pointer of the ROP payload.
event occurs. Using HPC-based profilers, developers can better
understand the runtime behavior of a program and tune its
performance [12].
HPCs provide detailed performance information with much
lower overhead than software profilers [13]. Furthermore, no
source code modifications are needed. The hardware events
that can be monitored vary from one processor model to
another; so does the number of available HPCs. For example,
early processors supported very few events and had only a
few HPCs. Intel Pentium III has two HPCs and can count
about a hundred different events [14]. AMD Opteron has over
a hundred events and four HPCs [15]. In contrast, the fourth
generation Intel Core Processor has hundreds of events and
eight HPCs per core. The ARM Cortex A-15 has six HPCs
and can count around 70 events [16].
III. SIGNATURE-BASED DETECTION OF ROP ATTACKS
A. Threat Model and Assumptions
The threat model allows the adversary to leverage a software
vulnerability such as a buffer overflow to gain control of the
program stack and to launch a ROP attack. The vulnerability
can be in kernel or user code, allowing the adversary to
launch the ROP attack on privileged or user-level software.
We assume the adversary has access to the software binary and
shared libraries in order obtain ROP gadgets. The adversary
is also able to bypass ASLR via information leakage or via
JIT-ROP attacks.
B. High-Level Description of SIGDROP
ROP payloads have two hardware-level properties:
1) mispredicted return for each gadget: a ROP gadget
ends with a return instruction, and such a return will
be mispredicted by the RAS because it has no associated
call instruction. Therefore, when a ROP payload is exe-
cuted, return instructions are consecutively mispredited.
2) short gadget size: to avoid unwanted side-effects on the
processor state after its atomic operation, a gadget should
have few instructions. Assuming the maximum number
TM TM TM
Fig. 2: High-level description of SIGDROP. SIGDROP divides the execution a program
into monitor intervals of TM consecutive mispredicted return instructions. For each
monitor interval, SIGDROP measures the occurrences of return instructions executed
and total instructions executed to determine if there is a sequence of gadgets belong
to a ROP payload (shaded rectangles). Each arrow in the figure represents a return
instruction.
of instructions in a ROP gadget allowed is TI , a ROP
payload with n gadgets has up to TI × n instructions.
Recent studies show a gadget in real-world ROP attacks
has TI ≤ 6 [7], [8], [11].
SIGDROP extracts runtime signatures of the monitored pro-
gram and detects a ROP attack when the signatures reflect
the properties of a ROP payload. Figure 2 depicts a high-
level description of SIGDROP. When a program is executed,
SIGDROP simultaneously monitors three low-level events,
mispredicted return instructions executed, return instructions
executed and total instructions executed, and takes snapshots
of the execution with an interval of TM consecutive mis-
predicted return instructions. For each snapshot, SIGDROP
looks for the following hardware event-based signatures ac-
cording to the two properties mentioned above respectively:
1) NR = TM , where NR is the number of return instructions
within the monitor interval; 2) NI ≤ (TI ×TM ), where NI is
the number of total instructions within the monitor interval.
SIGDROP uses three HPCs to measure the occurrences
of the monitored hardware events. Figure 3 shows the state
diagram of SIGDROP with respect to the HPCs. When TM
mispredicted return instructions are counted by an HPC, the
current execution is suspended and a check is triggered.
SIGDROP reads the event counts from the other two HPCs
to check if the number of return instructions NR is equal to
TM , and if the the number of total instructions NI is less than
or equal to TI ×TM . If both comparisons are true, SIGDROP
determines a ROP payload is executed and the execution is
terminated. Otherwise, SIGDROP resets all the HPCs and
resumes monitoring for the next interval.
IV. SIGDROP IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
Since the kernel is also vulnerable to ROP attacks, one
cannot rely on the HPC values returned by said kernel. There-
fore, we implement SIGDROP in a virtualization environment
and run the vulnerable kernel and user-level processes in
a guest virtual machine (VM). This approach provides the
added benefit of detecting ROP attacks at the kernel level.
For simplicity of proof-of-concept, we use the same kernel
for the host operating system (OS) and the guest VM.
Figure 4 illustrates the proof-of-concept implementation
of SIGDROP. We use KVM [17] to build the SIGDROP
virtualization environment. KVM runs unmodified guest OS
and user-level processes (i.e. images) using full virtualization
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Fig. 3: SIGDROP runtime signature via HPCs. SIGDROP uses three HPCs to form
a runtime signature of the monitored software. SIGDROP counts the the number of
total instructions, the number of return instructions, and the number of mispredicted
return instructions. For every TM mispredicted return instructions, SIGDROP checks
if the number of return instructions NR is equal to TM , and if the the number of
instructionsNI is less than or equal to TI×TM . If both comparisons are true, SIGDROP
determines a ROP payload is executed. Otherwise, SIGDROP resets the counters and
resumes monitoring.
and hardware extensions such as Intel VT for x86 virtual-
ization support [18]. The core component of SIGDROP is a
lightweight module added into the host kernel. The module
synchronizes with the host HPC driver and host KVM kernel
module to configure the HPCs and to interrupt guest execution
when TM is reached. We use the perf event HPC driver
available in all Linux 2.6+ kernels [19], and the KVM kernel
module provided in the Linux 3.13 kernel for our proof of
concept. perf event supports two modes of collecting HPC
values: counting mode, where the HPC values are aggregated,
and sampling mode, where an overflow non-maskable interrupt
(NMI) is triggered when the HPC reaches a pre-determined
threshold. SIGDROP monitors the number of total instructions
and return instructions in counting mode, and monitors the
number of mispredicted return instructions in sampling mode
using TM as the threshold for an NMI overflow. A program
running in the host user space dynamically adjusts TM and TI
at runtime.
To determine which process has been compromised to
launch the ROP attack, SIGDROP cooperates with the KVM
host kernel module to monitor every process. When the guest
VM is launched, the KVM module sends a unique VM
ID (VID) to SIGDROP. SIGDROP then uses perf event to
configure the HPCs to pin the monitoring to the VID, sets
the overflow threshold of the HPC for mispredicted return
instructions to TM , and initializes the HPCs. In this setup, the
HPCs monitor all processes that are executed within the guest
VM. There are two cases to consider: 1) no context switches
occur during a TM interval, 2) context switches occur during
a TM interval.
1) No Context Switch during TM interval: The overflow
NMI causes a VM-exit where the processor switches from
guest mode to host mode [18]. In addition, KVM updates the
VM control structure (VMCS) which is a data structure that
stores the state of internal registers of the guest VM [17]. If a
ROP payload is detected during that interval (as described in
Section III), SIGDROP uses the VMCS to obtain the values
for the CR3 and EIP register of the guest VM. SIGDROP
checks if the EIP is in the range of the kernel virtual memory
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Host Linux kernel
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Fig. 4: SIGDROP high-level architecture. A SIGDROP module is added into the host
kernel to cooperate with the KVM to intercept actions in the monitored guest VM, and
communicate with perf event kernel service to initialize, enable/disable, read, and close
HPCs; a program running in the host user space dynamically adjusts TM and TI at
runtime.
(i.e. 0xc0000000-0xffffffff) which indicates a kernel-level
ROP attack. In that case, SIGDROP requests the KVM kernel
module to shut down the guest VM. If the EIP range is
outside of the guest VM, SIGDROP determines a user-level
ROP attack and requests the KVM kernel module to block the
process with the CR3 value.
2) Context Switches during TM interval: The values of
the HPCs are accumulated for multiple processes in the guest
VM, leading to false positives. Moreover, a smart adversary
can induce false negatives by splitting the ROP gadget chain
between context switches to other processes. To avoid these
issues, SIGDROP uses a lookup table to store the signature of
the TM interval for each user-level process of the guest VM.
A context switch generates a VM-exit that saves the state
of the guest VM for the current process, and a VM-entry that
loads the state of the guest VM for the next process [18]. The
VMCS stores the CR3 of the current process on VM-exit, and
the CR3 of the next process on VM-enter [18]. SIGDROP
uses these values to update the lookup table entries for the
processes. During the VM-exit, SIGDROP uses the CR3 to
search the lookup table. If no entry is found, SIGDROP adds
a new entry for the CR3 which contains the values of the
three HPCs. If an entry is found for that CR3, SIGDROP
adds the values read from the HPCs to the current values
in the entry. SIGDROP then uses the updated values in the
entry to see if they meet the properties of a ROP payload (as
described in Section III)). During the VM-entry, SIGDROP
first resets the values of the HPCs. It then uses the CR3 of
the next process to search the lookup table. If no entry is
found, SIGDROP sets the overflow NMI threshold to TM and
notifies the KVM module to complete VM-entry. If an entry
is found, SIGDROP reads the number of mispredicted return
instructions in the entry, subtracts it from TM , and sets the
overflow NMI threshold to the result of the subtraction. This
way, when the number of mispredicted return instructions for
the process accumulates to TM , the overflow NMI is generated
and SIGDROP can use the values in the lookup table to detect
if the signature of a process matches a ROP payload.
V. EVALUATION
A. Detection Capability
To verify the effectiveness of SIGDROP, we perform exper-
iments on a platform with a 3.0GHz Intel Core i5-3330 CPU,
which has 11 HPCs on each core. SIGDROP is enable in the
host system running 32-bit Ubuntu 14.04, and ROP attacks are
launched inside the guest VM running the same OS.
1) Setting Parameters: In SIGDROP, TM and TI are critical
parameters for ROP detection which need to be properly tuned
to distinguish the gadget chains of ROP payloads and those
of normal execution flows. A recent research [8] shows that
existing real-world ROP attacks have at least 17 gadgets, and
the length of longest gadget chain of normal execution flows
is 10. The threshold for the gadget chain length G can be
a number from 11 to 16 to reduce the false positive and
false negative. In our experiment, we choose G = 12 as
the threshold. To avoid false negatives, the monitor interval
TM = bG2 c, which is 6. For the threshold TI , recent researches
on ROP detection [8], [11] and existing tools for automatic
gadget discovery [1], [20] limit the gadget size to at most 5-6
instructions. In our experiment, TI is set to 6.
2) Crafting ROP Payloads: In the experiment, we use a
small program with a stack buffer overflow vulnerability that
can be exploited by applying a long input parameter. The
program is compiled with statically linked C libraries. A
gadget search tool ROPgadget [21] is used to analyze the
compiled binary file and generate usable gadgets. We refer to
a set of Linux x86 shellcode from Exploits Database [22] and
then chain the found gadgets together to craft ROP payloads
that can perform the same actions, such as starting a shell and
changing the access permissions.
3) Detecting ROP Attacks: We test SIGDROP against the
ROP payloads as well as normal applications from Linux
/bin/ and /usr/bin/ and the SPEC INT2006 benchmark suite
[23]. We choose 40 normal applications and each of them
is executed 5 times so there are totally 200 executions. We
then run 30 ROP payloads with the different gadget chain
length G ≥ 12. Each execution is plotted as a point in Figure
5. The x-coordinate of a point indicates the smallest NR in
a monitor interval during the whole execution while the y-
coordinate indicates the NI in the same monitor interval. From
the results we can see that for most of executions of the normal
applications, the smallest NR in a monitor interval is larger
than TM , which violates the 1st property of ROP payloads.
For those with the smallest NR in a monitor interval equals
to TM , the NI in the same interval is greater than TI × TM ,
which violates the 2nd property of ROP payloads. Therefore
all the 200 executions are correctly considered as normal by
SIGDROP. In contrast, for all the executions of ROP payloads,
the smallest NR counted in a monitor interval equals to TM
and the corresponding NI is less than TI × TM , indicating
successful detections.
4) Detection with a Larger TM : In the next test, we
increase the monitor interval TM to 10, and test SIGDROP
against the same set of normal applications and ROP payloads.
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Fig. 5: SIGDROP detection capability. With TM = 6 and TI = 6, all the ROP payloads
with the gadget chain length G ≥ 12 are successfully detected by SIGDROP without
any false positive.
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Fig. 6: When TM is increased to 10, the false positive rate remains zero but there
are false negative encountered for detecting ROP payloads with the gadget chain length
12 ≤ G < 20.
The results are illustrated in Figure 6. We can observe that
the false positive rate remains zero for the normal applications
but there are some false negative encountered when the gadget
chain length 12 ≤ G < 20. The results confirm that to guaran-
tee zero false negatives, TM has to be less than bG2 c. However,
a smaller TM results in higher performance overhead. There
is a trade-off between the detection accuracy and the system
performance.
B. Performance Evaluation
Our next experiment is to test the performance overhead in
the guest system when SIGDROP is enabled. The evaluated
platform has the same hardware configuration the previous
experiment. The host is running 32-bit Ubuntu 14.04 (kernel
version 3.13.1) with 8GB RAM and 4-core configuration; The
guest VM is running the same OS with 2GB RAM and 1-core
configuration.
We choose two benchmarks to evaluate the overhead in the
guest VM on CPU computation and system throughput:
SPEC CPU Benchmark The SPEC INT2006 benchmark
suite is used to evaluate the computation performance in
the guest VM when SIGDROP is enabled with the moni-
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Fig. 7: The SPEC INT2006 benchmark results: CPU computation overhead of a guest
VM when SIGDROP is enabled with TM = 10 and TM = 6.
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Fig. 8: The UnixBench benchmark results: system throughput degradation of a guest
VM when SIGDROP is enabled with TM = 10 and TM = 6.
tor window size TM of 10 and 6, respectively. The results
are compared to the normal guest VM performance without
SIGDROP, as illustrated in Figure 7. All the numbers are
averaged over 20 runs. The average overhead of the guest
computation performance is 3.18% when TM = 10 and 4.67%
when TM = 6.
UnixBench Benchmark We choose UnixBench 5.1.3 [24]
to test more aspects of the guest system’s performance
with and without SIGDROP. We perform 11 individual tests
from the suite including process creation, pipe-based context
switching and process communication, file copying, system
call invocation, starting and reaping shell script, etc. The
overall presents the average. Figure 8 shows the results of
the experiment averaged over 20 runs. When TM = 10 and
TM = 6, the average system throughput degradation is 6.19%
and 7.94%, respectively.
C. Storage Overhead
Because SIGDROP detects ROP attacks based on general
signatures that are independent of the monitored program,
only the thresholds TM and TI need to be stored in the
memory. One byte is enough for storing each threshold, which
is negligible. Additionally, for each monitored hardware event,
one bytes is used to store the occurrences (i.e., up to 256,
which is large enough for the occurrences of any event within a
monitor interval). With three events monitored simultaneously,
each monitored process only requires 3 bytes of storage, which
is also negligible.
VI. RELATED WORK
KBouncer [7] and ROPecker [8] use the last branch record
(LBR) hardware registers to trace the target addresses of
indirect branches and compare them against the golden control
flow path of the software. Since LBR registers are only
available on Intel platforms, KBouncer and ROPecker are
not portable to AMD and ARM platforms. On the other
hand, SIGDROP can be adapted to commodity platforms with
readily available HPCs.
ROPdefender uses dynamic binary instrumentation to verify
the software CFI at the instruction trace granularity [9]. For
each call instruction to execute, ROPdefender pushes the
address of its return instruction on a shadow stack. For each
return instruction, ROPdefender pops the address on top of
the shadow stack and compares it to the address on top of the
program stack. ROPdefender incurs an average performance
overhead of 2.17x for integer SPEC CPU 2006 benchmarks.
SIGDROP has an overage overhead of 4.67% for the same
benchmarks.
G-Free is a compiler-based approach to thwart ROP attacks
by eliminating gadgets in x86 binaries without altering legit-
imate software behavior [3]. G-Free first protects the target
address of aligned free-branch instructions2 by encrypting the
target address of each return instruction, and by adding
a random cookie on the program stack before the target
address of each jump or call instruction. Second, G-Free
removes unaligned free-branch instructions by replacing them
with equivalent instructions. G-Free requires access to the
software source code which may not be available. Moreover,
the changes to the software binary may add new gadgets, de-
feating the purpose of the security countermeasure. SIGDROP
is portable and induces no new gadgets because it doesn’t
modify the source code.
Davi et. al. propose two new processor instructions that
enforce a golden CFI model [10]. For each direct and indirect
call instruction, a cfibr [label] instruction is added, where
[label] is a hard-coded, unique immediate value associated
to the call. cfibr pushes the label in a protected memory
segment. If no cfibr is found for the call instruction, the
processor assumes a CFI violation. Each return instruction
has an associated cfiret [label] instruction that verifies
if the [label] is in the protected memory segment. If no
matching [label] is found, a CFI violation is detected. The
proposed approach requires changes to different stages of the
processor pipeline to incorporate the new instructions and is
thus not portable to platforms currently available.
Reusing HPCs for security purposes has been applied to
many defense mechanisms. Demme et al. have demonstrated
a techniqeu to use HPCs to detect Android malware and Linux
rootkits [25]. Wang et. al. propose HPC-based runtime kernel
2Free-branch instructions are unconditional indirect branch instructions.
rootkit detection and identification in a virtualization envi-
ronment [26]. ConFirm is an HPC-based malicious firmware
detection to secure embedded platforms with limited comput-
ing resources [27]. Ozsoy et al. have developed an HPC-
based always-on hardware malware detection engine [28].
BRAIN leverages HPCs to measure the occurrences of low-
level hardware events to detect Distributed Denial of Servic
(DDoS) attacks [29].
VII. CONCLUSION
SIGDROP is a low-cost ROP detection approach which
is based on low-level properties inherent to ROP attacks.
Specifically, we observe special patterns in terms of certain
hardware events when a ROP attack occurs during program ex-
ecution. Such hardware event-based patterns form a signature
to flag ROP attacks at runtime. SIGDROP leverages Hardware
Performance Counters, which are already present in most
commodity processors, to efficiently capture and extract the
signature. We implement a prototype of SIGDROP on Linux.
Our evaluation demonstrates that SIGDROP can effectively
detect ROP attacks with acceptable performance overhead and
negligible storage overhead.
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